Abstract
Introduction
In the wake of trade liberalisation in the world economy and growing environmental consciousness, the issues of impacts of international trade and factor mobility on local and global environment are assuming increasing importance. Besides the effects of trade on environmental quality, there exists concerns that emanate from the use of a lax environment policy and/or standards as a means to attract investments in specific jurisdictions. These plant location decisions, in response to a weaker pollution standard, would have implications for the pattern of trade and resultant environmental outcomes.
Moreover, countries may free ride on global pollution reduction, at least to some extent, by setting environmental standards strategically.
In the literature on these issues, environmental standard set by a country is treated as a part of an endogenous environmental policy having impacts on both the level and geographical distribution of pollution (e.g., Copeland and Taylor, 1994 , 1995 , 2003 and Chichilnisky, 1994 . However, it is to be noted that the standard set in one country may influence standard setting actions in other countries. Existing literature ignores this strategic nature of choice of environmental standard. This paper aims at bridging this gap by formulating equilibrium standards in a strategic context. Developing a simple model of two country world, this paper analyses strategic choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental 3 standards and levels of pollution, local and global, under strategic standard setting with that under cooperative standard setting, i.e., with the world optimum levels of standards and pollution.
There are two opposing strategic effects in case of open economies, (a) due to local pollution and (b) due to global pollution, of environmental standards.
The first effect induces countries to set higher environmental standards in order to counteract the negative externality generated by the other country's environmental standard, whereas the second effect comes from the incentive to free ride on other country's efforts to combat global pollution. Therefore, if the strategic effect due to global pollution dominates (is dominated by) the strategic effect due to local pollution, environmental standards are strategic substitutes (complements). In contrary, in case of closed economies, environmental standards are always strategic substitutes, since only the incentive to free ride is in place. The strategic nature of environmental standards has implications to the equilibrium environmental standards and pollution levels. 
The Model: Partially Open Economies
Suppose that there are two countries, A and B, in the world. Both countries are partially open in the sense that free trade of commodities between countries is allowed, but relocations of production units from one country to another is prohibited by regulation. Both countries aim to minimize loss due to environmental pollution, which is generated due to production activities, by imposing environmental standards. We consider pollutants like CO 2 which cause both local as well as global pollution. Now, in the free trade environment, higher environmental standard in one country likely to weaken its position in international trade, which will induce higher production activity in the other country. As a result, higher environmental standard in country j likely to increase local pollution in country i; i, j = A, B, i = j. In other words, increase in the level of environmental standard in one country reduces local pollution in that country, but increases local pollution in the other country. Therefore, we can write the level of local pollution in country i as follows. 
where G 0 is the level of global pollution in absence of environmental standards.
The cost of imposing environmental standard of country i (i, j = A, B
and i = j) is given by
where c is the marginal implementation (administrative) cost, w is the marginal economic loss due to higher standard in own country, and ρ is the marginal economic gain due to higher standard in the other country (0 < c, 0 < ρ < w).
The loss function of country i due to environmental pollution, inclusive of the cost of imposing environmental standard, is
where δ (≥ 0) is the weight given to global pollution,
i, j = A, B, and i = j. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that countries 6 have symmetric loss functions. That is, we consider that β, c, w, ρ, and δ are invariant across countries. We assume that 2lβ < w + c < 2l + 4δg and 
There are two opposing strategic effects: strategic effect due to local pollution (
, and strategic effect due to global pollution
. It is easy to see that 
and
of country A and B, respectively. Clearly, if β < (6) and (7), we get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels of environmental standards as given in Lemma 1. We now characterise the optimum environmental standards from the world 's perspective. The loss of the world is the sum of the losses of the countries. Therefore, we can write the problem as follows.
Note that, in our context, the problem (8) can also be interpreted as the problem of the countries together, if they set environmental standards cooperatively.
2 Solving this problem we get the equilibrium outcome as given in Lemma 2. 
∂s w ∂β > 0. Therefore, we can say that, the world optimum level of environmental standards, i.e., the cooperative level of environmental standards, increase with an increase in β, if the cost of imposing environmental standard is low. Now, the cost of imposing standard in country i is negatively related to marginal economic gain (ρ) due to environmental standard in country j. So, the world optimum level of environmental standard increases with an increase in β, if ρ is high,
. In other words, if countries decides environmental standards cooperatively, equilibrium level of standard increases 2 Such situation is similar to that of collusion among firms.
due to an increase in β, if ρ >ρ. This result is in contrast to that in case of independent and simultaneous choice of environmental standards by the countries.
Comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we get, s w < s * , if 
, non-cooperative) standard setting by countries, if marginal economic gain (ρ) of one country due to an increase in environmental standard in the other country is less (greater) than a critical level (ρ). Moreover, if ρ <ρ, levels of local and global pollution are also higher at the world optimum level of standards.
From the above proposition, we can say that, in case of partially open economies, coordination among countries to set environmental standards may cause more damage to the environment compared to the situation where no
such coordination is possible. It also indicates that existence of supranational authorities, which can set standards for countries or facilitates cooperation among countries to set standards jointly, may be detrimental for the environment in certain situations.
Closed Economies
We now consider a scenario in which both countries, A and B, are closed.
Since both are closed economies, no trade is possible between countries.
Therefore, there is no positive or negative externalities of environmental standards of one country to the other country, except its effect on global pollution. So, we have β = 0 and ρ = 0 in (1) and (3) That is, the strategic effect due to local pollution is non-existent in case of 
Fully Open Economies
We 
The expression for global pollution remains same as that in case of partially open economies, given by (2). Now, the cost of imposing environmental standard of country i, in case of open economies, is as follows.
i, j = A, B, i = j, 0 < φ < w, where φ is the marginal economic gain (loss) of country i due to relocation of production units from country j (i) to country i 
Clearly,β and φ has opposing effects on s * f . Therefore, whether countries set higher standard in case of fully open economies, compared to that in case of partially open economies, depends on the relative strength of these two opposing effects: increase in local pollution due to relocation and increase in economic gain due to relocation.
The world optimum level of environmental standards, which are same as the equilibrium standards set by countries cooperatively, are as follows. open economies, if the second factor is weak, simultaneous and independent choice, i.e., strategic choice, of environmental standards by countries leads to higher environmental standards than the world optimum. In contrast, the world optimum level of environmental standards are always higher than that under strategic choice, in case of closed economies.
Our results indicate that existence of supranational authorities that set environmental standards for the countries from the world welfare perspective or facilitates cooperation among countries to set environmental standards cooperatively, need not necessarily lead to lower levels of pollution compared to that under strategic choice.
In this paper, for simplicity, we have considered symmetric loss functions of countries. However, it is easy to observe that as long as countries are not too asymmetric with respect to their loss functions, qualitative results of this paper will remain valid. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to examine the implications of different aspects of asymmetry between countries explicitly.
It might also be interesting to extend the present analysis by considering repeated move of countries.
